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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the managers’ 
remunerations and the company’s performance and to propose a visualization technique so that this 
link can be better understood by stakeholders. 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper presents an analysis of the compulsory and voluntary 
disclosure in a sample of Italian listed companies. Content analysis method is used to identify the 
state of the environmental and social disclosure in the reports.  
Findings – It is argued that information on managers’ remunerations and company’s performance is 
actually provided in the available disclosure, but it is spread over several documents and this makes 
the understanding of the link quite difficult to stakeholders, especially to the non-expert ones.  
Research limitations/implications – The research considers only the companies which operates in 
the Italian context. So the applicability of the results to other national contexts may be limited. 
Moreover, the study does not consider the voluntary disclosures reported in various communication 
tools (press releases, web sites, etc.). Further research could investigate the link between managers’ 
remunerations and corporate performances in different countries and analyze different kind of 
communication tools. 
Practical implications – The paper highlights the need to build a visual representation able to 
collect and link to each other this kind of information. Rather than disclosing information through 
the current practices, companies are invited to adopt a clearer approach in order to enhance the 
comprehensibility of the disclosure to stakeholders. 
Social implications - It is argued that the map can support the decision making process of potential 
investors as well as enable the minority shareholders to use the defensive tools provided by the law.  
Originality/value – The paper openly questions the link between the managers’ remunerations and 
the company’s performance by proposing a tool which is potentially able to align the company’s 
disclosure to the stakeholders’ information needs. 
Paper type – Research paper 
Keywords: managers; remunerations; economic, social and environmental performance; social 
reporting; visualization techniques. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Managers should acknowledge the potential conflicts between (a) their own role as corporate 
stakeholders, and (b) their legal and moral responsibilities for the interests of all stakeholders, and 
should address such conflicts through open communication, appropriate reporting and incentive 
systems and, where necessary, third party review.” 
CLARKSON, 1999 
 
Attention and pressure placed upon corporations to identify, manage and respond to performance 
perceptions of individuals or groups, whose support is critical to the organisation’s long term 
success, are rising.  
On the one hand, managers need accountability mechanisms able to recognize stewardship for the 
resources entrusted to it (Gray and Guthrie, 2007, p. 91) and to demonstrate and raise the 
trustworthiness as a part of a reputation building process (Owen et al., 2001). On the other hand, the 
combination of quantitative and qualitative financial and non-financial information has to be able to 
satisfy stakeholders’ needs to assess whether the managers’ entity is socially, financially and 
environmentally responsible (Gray and Guthrie, 2007, p. 23). 
In such a context, analysing the link - between managers’ incentive systems and the economic, 
social and environmental performance of the corporation - is very relevant to assess the 
transparency on manager’ behaviours. For this reason, this paper aims to discuss the 
understandability of disclosures on this topic, recorded in financial, social and environmental 
reporting. 
In this study, we seek to determine which voluntary and compulsory information is disclosed, 
according to national and international standards and whether there are significant differences in 
remuneration/performance reporting adopted by Italian listed companies.  
Through an analysis of compulsory and voluntary reports, we found that information on the 
managers’ remunerations and the company’s overall performance are currently provided in the 
available disclosure.  
However, reports do not communicate it so clearly, avoiding, as a consequence, to reach a high 
degree of comprehensibility. This potentially entails a barrier for non-expert stakeholders who try to 
understand the link between these two topics as well as identifying potential conflicts of interest. 
For these reasons, we propose a map to appropriate reporting of understandable information about 
legal and moral responsibilities for the interests of all stakeholders. 
To address the relationship between the managers’ remuneration and the company’s performance, 
this paper is presented in a further four sections. In section 2, a discussion of the managers’ legal 
and moral obligations and the resulting opportunities of reporting is provided as well as a critique of 
the current state of reporting practices is expressed. In section 3, the empirical evidence from the 
analysis of the compulsory and voluntary disclosure in a sample of Italian listed companies is 
showed. This is followed in section 4 with a proposal of a visualization technique which can 
potentially make the link clearer to the stakeholders, especially to the non-expert ones. Section 5 
presents the conclusion by showing the main implications of the results for future research aimed at 
further investigating the link between managers’ remunerations and company’s performances. 
 
2. Managers’ legal and moral obligations: the opportunities of reporting 
The identification of an organization’s responsibilities hides two main sets of considerations. On 
one hand, it is necessary to consider that the responsibilities change with time and place; on the 
other hand, it should ask about who determines such responsibilities. 
The first assumption is based on the dynamic and changing nature of responsibilities, which are 
originated by both the personal individual conditions and by the features of the company’s system. 
The balances between the subjects and the regulatory, civil and environmental conditions, in which 
they operate, change in different periods and from place to place. 
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The second issue concerns the assumption that, in a system, a contract is always fulfilled, often 
unwritten and not explicit, from which the responsibilities are derived (Gray et al., 1987, p. 2). 
There is the need to determine who is “the principal” and who is “the agent” of the contract in 
order to determine rights and duties. The principal is the one who provides the instructions to the 
agent about actions to follow, giving in exchange rewards (usually monetary) and power on the 
necessary resources to implement them. So the agent is responsible for the action itself and he has 
the responsibility to report such acts. 
The typical case is the legal obligation derived from the relationship between a company’s 
managers with the shareholders of such company. This relationship gives rise to a series of actions, 
subjected to payment, on the basis of a contract with the shareholder and the manager reports his 
actions in the financial statements. Such a relationship could create potential conflicts of interest 
when one of the parties has influence over the operating polices of the other.  
The possibility of changing the course of wealth entails the opportunity to take advances and to 
obtain personal gains at the cost of other subjects involved in the system without influence in group 
decisions (Johnson et al., 2000). Indeed, controlling shareholders and insiders, like managers, with 
opportunistic purposes and with the power to decide in the companies where they work can 
undertake operations to obtain personal benefits to the other shareholders’ cost. In this context, the 
agency costs theory examined by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
describes the agency conflict between manager and shareholders (Anglo-Saxon model) as the 
manager’s tendency to expropriate the resources of the company for personal use (Morck and 
Yeung, 2003). 
The relationships so organized are only a small part of the ones that a company puts in place 
operating as a social institution and a manifestation of human action. In fact, as McGuire argued, 
“the corporation has not only economic and legal obligations, but also certain responsibilities to 
society which extend beyond these obligations” (1963, p. 144). Then, a broad range of stakeholders 
(suppliers, customers, employees, shareholders and the local community, as well as management in 
its role of agent of these groups) justifies the existence of the corporation and helps in defining both 
corporation rights and responsibilities to parties other than itself (as a legal entity) and those to 
whom it acknowledges being responsible (Donaldson, 1982). All of these stakeholders have a 
legitimate interest or claim on organisation’s activities. 
Drawing from these considerations, managers’ responsibility is not only to shareholders but also to 
“[…] any individual or group who can affect or is affected by the actions, decisions, policies, or 
goals of the organisations” (Carrol, 2007, p. 67). Accordingly, they must develop a relationship of 
trust with a wide range of stakeholders, adopting processes and behaviors that respect legal 
obligations (as a result of a formal contract with their own company) and moral obligations derived 
from the "social contract" between entities and society.  
According to Mathews (1984), a company’s responses to its perceived social obligations are 
communicated through its action (or inaction), but also its public statements.  
Public statements are mainly annual reports, in which financial information is disclosed, in 
accordance with compulsory standards and regulations. The data which is included in the 
calculations and presentation of this kind of statement (i.e.: assets, liabilities, revenues and 
expenses) could provide a partial view of the status of the enterprise at a point in time, ignoring how 
the result of economic activity has been achieved (Gray, 2006). Moreover, the annual report “may 
result in a somewhat incomplete picture of disclosure practices” (Roberts, 1991, p. 63) and risk to 
underestimate the volume of Corporate Social Reporting (CSR) practices (Unermann, 2000). 
For these reasons, an extension of disclosures into non-traditional areas such as “providing 
information about employees, products, community service and the prevention or reduction of 
pollution” (Mathews and Perera, 1995, p. 364) has to be considered by stakeholders in order to 
assess whether the entity is socially, financially and environmentally responsible.  
Therefore, if the annual report has to collect and report economic-financial information, social 
accounting reports could increase accountability and transparency of the company’s activities (see 
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for example, Gray et al., 1996; Mio, 2010; Manetti, 2011; Hassan and Ibrahim, 2012). The CSR has 
the potential of being “the instrument par excellence for managing stakeholder relations. […]. As 
such, it is a concrete manifestation of a company’s commitment to transparency” (Kaptein, 2007, p. 
73). Social accounting issues, in fact, “include employees and product related matters and 
externalities (market failures) and the environment” (Mathews, 1993, p. viii). 
As confirmed by Gordon, “to ensure the social contract is met, society needs social accounting 
reports in much the same way that capital markets require the financial information supplied by the 
financial accounting system” (2007, p. 23).  
Social accounting implicates the measurement of the impact of an organization’s activities on the 
social environment within it operates, through the preparation and publication of social accounts 
that range from financial information to “a combination of quantified non-financial information and 
descriptive, non-quantified information” (Gray, 2000, p. 250).  
Previous studies have shown that important variables that could influence the level of social 
disclosures appear to be: corporate size (Cowen et al., 1987; Adams et al., 1998), corporate age 
(Roberts, 1992), management decision horizons (Trotman and Bradley, 1981) and the country of 
origin of a company (Trotman and Bradley, 1981; Cowen et al., 1987; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; 
Roberts, 1991; Adams et al., 1998). Other scholars found that a social and political context may 
constitute an influencing factor in shaping social and environmental disclosures (Burchell, Clubb et 
al. 1985; Adams and Harte, 1998) as well as corporate culture (Adams, 2002) and ethical relativism 
(Lewis and Unerman, 1999).  
There is another part of the research that provides evidence that social disclosures are motivated by 
a desire, by management, to legitimize various aspects of their organizations and investigates what 
motivates managers to reveal information about it (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Patten, 1992; Roberts, 
1992; Adams et al., 1998; Deegan, 2002). In particular, Freedman and Stagliano argued that “Social 
disclosure, for the most part, is a function of the attitude of top management toward its stakeholders. 
Whether there is an economic motivation for the disclosure… a reaction to user needs… or a 
political motivation…is probably a consequence of each management’s particular perception of the 
world it faces.” (1992, p. 113). 
Thus, on the one hand, managers have to report to shareholders their actions and to demonstrate the 
achievement of business objectives, disclosing economic results on the financial statement. This 
allows them to receive a remuneration which is related to the attained performance.  On the other 
hand, managers are stakeholders of the corporation (as employees) and are interested in the 
environmental, social and economic impact of business activities; they are part of the society and 
this determines moral obligations. Moreover, often, managers have the strategic responsibility. So 
there should be a balance between individual goals and organizational targets. However, the role of 
agent and stakeholder could create conflict in the decision-making process, and, as a consequence, 
in the achievement of business performance. “[...] open communication, appropriate reporting and, 
where necessary, third party review” (Clarkson, 1999) should address such conflicts. 
For these reasons, the analysis of financial information about remunerations (included on the annual 
report) and its link with performances could constitute a possible way to address transparency about 
managers’ behaviours (Rodriguez and Seabra, 2011). In addition, social reports have to be 
considered to assess the same link with, not only financial, but also environmental and social 
performance. So the information on managers’ remuneration and its link with the company’s 
performance can hide potential conflicts of interests. Managers’ remunerations, in fact, should be 
consistent with the company’s performance. But the presence of this kind of information might not 
be sufficient to assess whether corporations (and so managers who participate in the decision-
making process) are socially, financially and environmentally responsible. Delving into 
communication, in fact, opens the consideration to two main principles of rational communication: 
comprehensibility and appropriateness (Habermas, 1990). The respect of the same principles is also 
underlined in regard to CSR; in fact, the qualitative characteristics of a report should be relevance, 
completeness, comparability, timeliness, reliability, directness and comprehensibility (Gray et al., 
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1987). The consideration of these aspects involves, operatively, the observance/compliance of the 
following propositions:  
 
 “The report, in its choice of data, emphasis, method of presentation, and availability, should provide 
information directly relevant to its objectives and in particular to the objectives it holds for the interest 
groups to whom it is directed. […]. The report should present direct, raw (unmanipulated) data that can be 
understood by a non-expert undertaking a careful and intelligent reading of the report.”(Gray et al., 1987, p. 
83-85) 
 
Starting from the last consideration, the present study seeks to highlight the understandability of the 
disclosure of the information for a non- expert reader. 
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3. Empirical analysis in the Italian market: the link between remuneration and economic, 
social and environmental performance. 
 
Sample 
The sample is selected considering the listed companies in the Italian market (using the 
“Datastream” database) without including the financial companies with sic codes from 6000 to 
6999. We do not include also companies for which the sic codes were not available. Then, the final 
list of 215 listed companies in the Italian market in 2011 is obtained by matching the listening date 
and eventual delisting date, excluding also the dead ones. At this point we look for the social reports 
(as well as the sustainability report, environmental report or similar disclosures reported in a table 
or pictures) in each company’s website finding only  31 documents, which we use for the analysis. 
In particular, the exploration proceeded as follows:  
- searching for the name of the company (included in the sample) using internet search tools; 
- discrimination of available websites, choosing the official company site (most immediate); 
- overview of the company home page and the main categories of information (which are available 
on toolbars or page forefront); 
- analysis of subcategories (brought back in cascade menu connected to main categories or new 
windows); 
- connection to others links, choosing those which contain meaningful key words, functional to 
verify the availability of the report. 
 
Object of empirical analysis: compulsory and voluntary information 
The first step is to analyse information on managers’ remuneration in compulsory documents in the 
Italian context (financial statement and reports on remuneration) required by national and 
international standards. The international standards of reference are the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS). In particular, the attention is on IAS 24 which includes the definition of key 
management (useful to address our research). 
Key management personnel are considered as people who have the authority and the responsibility 
for planning, directing and controlling the activities of the entity including any director (whether 
executive or otherwise) of the entity (IAS 24).  
Looking at compulsory information about key management remunerations and the link between that 
and performance - in case of Italian companies with shares listed on regulated markets in Italy or in 
any other country in the EU and Italian companies with shares widely distributed among the public 
- we consider IAS, Consob resolutions (Italian Securities Authority) and TUF (Consolidated Law 
on Finance). As for the IAS, in general, some compulsory information has to be disclosed in order 
to understand the potential effects that a relationship with a related party has in the financial 
statement of an entity: the amount of the transactions; the amount of the outstanding balances, their 
terms and conditions, the nature of the consideration set for settlement and details of any guarantee 
given or received; provisions for doubtful debts related to amounts included in the outstanding 
balances, and the expenses recognized during the year, relating to bad or doubtful debts due from 
related parties (IAS 24, paragraph 17). For the key management personnel of the entity or its 
dominant, considered as an entity’s related party, the information required has to be provided 
separately. Moreover, for their particular position and necessity of transparency, such IAS 
establishes that in the financial statement an entity has also to disclose information of remuneration 
as the following schedule form shows (IAS 24, par.16). 
 
Example of schedule form about  remuneration in total of Key management 
Short-term 
employee 
benefits 
Post-
employment 
benefits 
Other long-
term benefits 
Termination  
benefits 
Share-based 
payment  
Total amount of 
key management 
remuneration* 
      
*In a group, the information of key managers’ remuneration is for the managers of the entity which draws up the 
financial statement and also for the entity’s subsidiaries’ managers. 
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The first three benefits could be cash or other kinds of payment. 
For the stability of the financial market, national standards require other specific information which 
must be approved by ordinary meeting by the Italian Legislative Decree 259/2010 based on the 
recommendations of European Commission 2004/913/EC and 2009/385/EC. In particular, the 
Remuneration statement required by the article 123 ter of the TUF (implemented by Consob with 
the resolution n.18049 of 23rd December 2011) must be divided into two sections. The first section 
is about the company's policy on the remuneration of the members of the directors board, general 
managers and managers with strategic responsibilities (referred to at least the next year), as well as 
the explanations of the procedures used for the adoption and implementation of this policy. Then, in 
the second section, a representation of each component of the remuneration is provided for each 
member of the administrative and control board, general managers and, in aggregate form, for the 
key management personnel. Moreover, this second section highlights the consistency with the 
company's policy on remuneration approved during the year and the previous ones. Then, it shows 
analytically the compensation paid during the reporting period and the previous years for any reason 
and in any form by the Company and by its subsidiaries or associates, indicating the possible 
components of these fees and possibly indicating an estimated value for the components that cannot 
be objectively quantified during the period. In addition to the remuneration statement on the website 
of the listed companies, there is a document containing information related to financial instruments 
of such company held by the corporate members (required also by Art. 114-bis TUF). 
In order to analyse the social accounting reports, the attention is based on the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) standards, which develop a broadly-based triple-bottom line approach. In particular, 
“the GRI reflects current practices where environmental data is much more readily disclosed than 
other forms of information” (Gray, 2006, p. 807). 
In GRI (version 3.1), in the governance session, several indicators aim to underline the transparency 
policies of corporate boards. To reach the research objective the indicator 4.5 is considered:  
 
“linkage between compensation for members of the highest governance body, senior managers, and 
executives (including departure arrangements), and the organization’s performance (including social and 
environmental, performance)”. 
 
Findings: describing the actual situation of compulsory and voluntary information  
Content analysis method is used to identify the state of environmental and social disclosure in the 
reports. Content analysis is defined as “a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their context” (Krippendorff, 1980). Content analysis is a method of 
codifying text or content of a piece of writing into various groups or categories depending on 
selected criteria (Weber, 1988).  
Starting from the requirements illustrated in the paragraph above, we look for each possible 
information given in the Report on Remuneration (as a summary of the others), able to explain the 
link between managers’ remunerations and business performances. Findings show that, in each 
document, the internal authority (the Remuneration Committee) is named and it establishes 
parameters (criteria) to determine the amount of remunerations (direct or indirect). Moreover, in 
most of the analysed reports, the nature of these parameters (i.e.: economic or financial performance 
indicators, market trends, the tendencies of the share market, etc...) is cited as well as the presence 
of a performance evaluation system, like the MBO (management by objectives) system.  So, the 
information about the remunerations, the criteria used to estimate it and the information on different 
considered performances are present and it might be possible to calculate some additional indicators 
to assess the link between the two variables. However, the correlation with aspects (like relevant 
influence, ...) able to show conflicts of interests are not illustrated in a direct way: the information is 
often spatially distributed on several documents and a non-expert reader could find it difficult to 
assess the impact of these policies on the business performances and the linked managers’ 
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remunerations. Moreover, the analyzed compulsory reports do not refer to any social and 
environmental disclosures. 
In order to test the link between managers’ remunerations and economic, social and environmental 
performances, we focus on voluntary information (quoted in the paragraph above) which 
summarizes the information disclosed in the social reporting available for our sample. All of the 
social reports, as well as the sustainability report, environmental report or similar disclosures 
reported in table or pictures, are edited according to GRI standards (version 3.1). 
In particular, findings show: 
 
 
 
Information on managers' 
remunerations Reference to nature of organization’s performance (including 
social and environmental performance). 
  
Reference to 
Remuneration 
Commettee 
Reference to Report 
on Remuneration 
Company 1 yes yes no reference 
Company 2 yes yes economic results of corporation and market trends 
Company 3 yes integrated in the report corporation performance 
Company 4 yes yes no reference 
Company 5 yes no corporation performance 
Company 6 yes no MBO system (including sustainability issues) 
Company 7 no no no reference 
Company 8 yes no economic results of corporation and stock options plan 
Company 9 yes no corporation performance (including non economic indicators) 
Company 10 no yes incentive system connected to economic results (in order to guarantee sustainability of the organization) 
Company 11 no yes measurement system of results achieved by each person  
Company 12 yes no "criteria" in general 
Company 13 yes no no reference 
Company 14 no no 
economic indicators but also environmental indicators (energy or 
water consumption reduction, waste production) and social 
indicators (able to understand the health and safety of workers) 
for specific managers. 
Company 15 no no reference to annual report 
Company 16 no no no reference 
Company 17 yes yes no reference 
Company 18  yes yes incentive system connected to economic results and reference to annual report 
Company 19 no integrated in the report no reference 
Company 20 no no no reference 
Company 21 yes no no reference 
Company 22 no no no reference 
Company 23 no no no reference 
Company 24 yes yes "criteria" in general 
Company 25 yes no no reference 
Company 26 yes yes 
managers' remuneration connected to company profitability, 
behaviours and professional skills; variable remuneration 
connected to annual and long term objectives (linked to 
sustainability). Reference to annual report 
Company 27 no no no reference 
Company 28 no no incentive system connected to company and personal objectives 
Company 29 yes yes 
incentive system connected to company objectives (linked to 
sustainability topics) and personal activities. Reference to annual 
report 
Company 30 yes 
no 
incentives connected with the position held, the importance of 
such position and the positioning of the individual manager into 
the performance/potential matrix 
Company 31 no no no reference 
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The presented table underlines that social reports, in the large part of the analysed documents, refers 
to the “linkage between compensation for members of the highest governance body, senior 
managers, and executives (including departure arrangements), and the organization’s performance 
(including social and environmental performance)”. Despite the evidence, the social accounting 
reports of listed companies in our sample stress only the existence of the interaction between 
remunerations and performance, without highlighting the univocal relation and without presenting 
economic, social and/or environmental indicators used to calculate managers’ incentives. The same 
considerations, claimed for compulsory information, are valid for the voluntary disclosure too, with 
a difference: in the Report on Remuneration, the nature of criteria (mainly financial/economic) and 
the linked parameters are reported, as required by national and international standards; in the social 
reports, except in one case, there is a lack of information about the typology, the nature and the 
target of the considered organisation’s performances.  
In the end, available disclosures on financial and/or social accounting reports appear unclear to 
reach the comprehensibility of our research objective. 
Since the state of the art in this research area is still unable to provide exhaustive answers, we need 
further steps aimed at understanding which types of tools are suitable in order to increase the 
understandability of the link between managers’ remunerations and company’s performance. 
For this reason in the next paragraph we will propose a tool, i.e. a visualization technique, which 
can potentially fill the gap highlighted in this paragraph. 
 
4. Visualization techniques to increase the comprehensibility of the link between 
remuneration and economic, social and environmental performance 
Visualization techniques have been widely used in the fields of management and organization. 
Managers usually act in very complex contexts and one of the fundamental challenges they have to 
face is to filter and organize the information that flows from their environments. Graphic 
representations, above all in the form of maps, are particularly suitable to clarify and dominate 
complex and ambiguous situations (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2002, p. 22; Huff and Jenkins, 2002, 
p. 14; Montemari and Nielsen, 2012, p. 95). In other words, maps are able to identify and collect the 
main elements of a domain as well as the relationships among these elements, providing an 
immediate understanding of the problem or the situation under analysis. For these reasons, building 
a graphic representation could be very useful to put in order and examine the relationship between 
the managers’ remuneration and the company’s performance. As discussed above, the information 
on these topics is provided by the companies, but it is spread over a wide range of documents. This 
fragmentation makes the understanding of the link between these topics very difficult for 
stakeholders, especially for the non-expert ones. Building a visual representation allows us to 
collect and put in order the information in just one domain, making it simpler and clearer to 
understand for stakeholders. So making this structure more visible means giving a frame of 
reference for what is known to stakeholders, helping them to better perceive and understand the link 
between the managers’ remuneration and the company’s performance. In other words, an overall 
picture containing all the relevant information can support the stakeholders in identifying the 
potential conflicts of interest or other risky situations. A map can be defined as a network of nodes 
and arrows (Fiol and Huff, 1992). The nodes of the map identify: 
− the main managers of the companies involved, i.e. the individuals who have a relevant 
influence on the decision making process of the company; 
− the companies themselves and their overall performance (economic, social and environmental). 
The arrows detect the relationships between these two types of nodes. In particular, the arrows 
“discover”: 
− the typology of influence that the manager wields on the company; 
− the typology of remuneration that the manager receives from the company. 
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The thickness of the arrows identifies the strength of the influence and the amount of the 
retribution. This tool makes it possible to identify the most important individuals and to visualize 
the relationship network among them and the companies, in terms of influence and remuneration 
relations and their impact on the companies’ performance. 
 
 
 
The centre of the map is the individual, with his features.  
 
 
 
From him, two arrows start:  
• a yellow one for the remunerations he gets from the company 
 
1) Emolument for the position 
2) Non-monetary benefits 
3) Bonus and other incentives 
4) Stock options assigned to the individual 
5) Other remunerations  
 
 
• a red one for the degree of the relationship intensity between the individual and a company  
 
The intensity of the relationship can be developed 
in three principal possible levels of the arrow: 
a) The individual is a member of the key 
management personnel of an entity.  
b) The individual has control or joint control or 
significant influence over an entity.  
c) The individual has a close family member who 
is part of the key management.  
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We have to consider that: 
− “control” is the power to govern the financial and operating policies of an entity so as to 
obtain benefits from its activities (IAS 27); 
− “joint control” is the contractually agreed sharing of control over an economic activity (IAS 
31); 
− “significant influence” is the power to participate in the financial and operating policy 
decisions of the entity, but does not mean control over those policies. It may be created by 
share ownership, statute or agreement (IAS 28). 
Moreover, the IAS 24, 2009 version, includes as for “close member of the family”: 
o that person’s children and spouse or domestic partner; 
o children of that person’s spouse or domestic partner; and 
o dependents of that person or that person’s spouse or domestic partner. 
 
Regarding the yellow arrow, the color intensity can be weak or strong. The stronger it is, the higher 
is the remuneration that the manager gets from the company. As discussed above, the remuneration 
is made up of different elements (emolument for the position, non-monetary benefits, etc.). The 
cells of the arrows have to be colored depending on the amount and the typology of the 
compensation that the manager actually gets.  
As well as the yellow arrow, the red arrow too can be thick or thin, depending on the intensity of the 
relationship between the manager and the company.  
The thicker it is, the stronger is the influence that the manager can exercise over the company, 
increasing, as a consequence, the risk of potential conflicts of interest. In other words, the thickness 
and the color intensity of the arrow can be considered as an indicator of potential risky situations. 
The arrows get to a company which can be the reporting entity or any other company of the group, 
so a related party of the reporting entity and indirectly related to the individual. 
In order to assess the consistency between the managers’ remuneration and the company’s 
performance, the map should be matched with some indicators able to measure the current 
economic (such as ROI, EBITDA), social (i.e.: operations with significant potential or actual 
negative impacts on local communities; average hours of training per year per employee, by gender, 
and by employee category) and environmental performance (related, for example, to energy, 
emissions, effluents, and waste). 
Each facet of the performance should be compared to the average of the performance of three 
previous years in order to assess the ability of the company to reach its targets from an economic, a 
social and an environmental perspective.  
From a visualization point of view, each aspect of the past and the current performance could be 
represented with a couple of concentric circles. So the map contains three couples of concentric 
circles for each company, one for the past and the current economic performance, one for the past 
and the current social performance and one for the past and the current environmental performance. 
Comparing the size of the circles lets the reader understand the performance trend. For example, if 
the circle which represents the current economic performance is bigger compared to the circle 
which represents the past economic performance, the reader immediately understands that there has 
been an improvement from an economic perspective.  
By way of illustration, in the map we represent only two companies. However, all the companies of 
the group which have a relationship with the analyzed individual have to be represented. 
Moreover, in order to explicate the relationships among the different companies in the same group, 
we use a red dotted line coupled with the percentage of stake holding among the companies in the 
group (for example 51% as represented in the map). Here too, the higher is the percentage of stake 
holding, the thicker is the line in order to immediately point out the strength of the relationships. 
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5. Conclusion 
Accountability mechanisms represent the possible communication tools able to address managers’ 
conflicts, under legal and moral obligations determined by the agency contract with shareholders 
and the social contract with society. To allow these forms of communication, reports have to be 
compiled with comprehensive norms not only for shareholders but for a wide range of stakeholders.  
As argued above, reading the current listed companies annual reports and the other voluntary 
documents, the understanding of the real effect on performance of the actions of the board of 
directors and managers with strategic responsibilities is not easy. 
Nevertheless the group’s investors, creditors and other stakeholders have a lot of information about 
the managers’ remunerations, the degree of the relationship intensity and the company’s 
performance, they are not able to fully understand it as well as its correctness because information 
is not collected and linked to each other in a single framework. As a consequence, the potential 
conflicts of interests are left hidden. 
We think that a suitable tool to enhance the comprehensibility of the information and the 
transparency of managers’ behaviours is the mapping of the link between their remunerations and 
the economic, social and environmental performance of the entity, of the group and of those 
companies in the group where they can exercise influence. 
We think that there is the necessity to integrate and link to each other the different compulsory and 
voluntary information disclosed in order to increase the transparency and to understand the impact 
of the remuneration on performance and vice versa. 
To communicate relationships and data in an understandable and functional way, finalizing the 
information in a map which summarizes and simplifies the reality could protect all the stakeholders 
and preserve the companies’ values. On the one hand, the map displaying the intensity through the 
arrows’ colours - and with the central nodes - immediately let the minority shareholders to assess 
the potential situation of interests’ conflict and its implication. In turn, this increased awareness can 
enable the minority shareholders to use the defensive tools provided by the law (for responsibility 
action against administrators, auditors and general directors; for reporting to a board of auditors and 
to a tribunal; and for convening a shareholders meeting). From the other hand, the map can support 
the decision making process of potential investors. In other words, information provided by the map 
can help the investors to choose if and how to invest in a certain company. 
The study presents some limitations. The first one is related to this Italian sample. The research 
considers only the companies which operate in the Italian context. So the applicability of the results 
to other national contexts may be limited. Moreover, the study does not consider the integrative 
regulations and voluntary disclosures reported in various communication tools (press releases, web 
sites, etc.). Further research could address and investigate the link between managers’ 
remunerations and corporate performances (economic, social and environmental) in a spatial 
dimension (different countries as well as different kind of communication tools), to develop a 
visualization technique applicable in a univocal way and understandable to a non-expert reader.
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